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THE PURSUIT OF A CLIENT'S INTEREST 
Warren Lehman* 
I 
[I]t is sometimes more fun to have a bad case than a good one 
for it tests your powers of persuasion more severely. Certainly I 
have seldom felt better pleased than when I persuaded three out 
of five law Lords to come to a decision which I was convinced was 
wrong . ... 
The Rt. Honorable Lord Cross of Chelsea 
There has been recently a resurgence of interest in how the 
lawyer serves his client. Much of that interest has been occa-
sioned by the indigestibility of the idea that the lawyer is, as it 
is said, a hired gun. There are those who think that instead the 
lawyer ought to act toward his client as a therapist. Others are 
concerned with rationalizing for the lawyer the ethical discom-
forts of servantship (which many might guess have been brought 
to the fore by Watergate). Yet others see the client as victim of a 
structure - represented by the lawyer - that frustrates his inter-
ests while appearing to further them. Whether the tragedy is 
personal or structural, whether the victim is the lawyer or the 
client, the character of the lawyer-client relation is a persistent 
issue. This paper is concerned with that relation. It was written 
while I was unaware of all this recent work on the subject. There 
are some losses as a result of that innocence; there are, however, 
enough advantages to justify my leaving the Article essentially as 
I wrote it. It would certainly have been more difficult to write and 
probably much longer, for no reason but 'to inflate my ego or 
improve my image, had I been tempted to turn the Article into a 
contribution to a debate. It would also, I think, have been a worse 
Article. It has been hard enough to put together in straightfor-
ward fashion what I want to say. Equally important, the tone 
would have changed from meditation to argument. That, too, 
would have been a loss. We are dealing with'. the most difficult 
problems of the interior and virtuous life. Ethical dilemmas do 
not resolve under the assault of argument. We must speak more 
gently to the spirit. I have not found the way to score points 
gently. 
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. A.B. 1950, J.D. 
1964, Univemity of Chicago. - Ed. 
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II 
Clients come to lawyers for help with important decisions in 
their business and private lives. How do lawyers respond to these 
requests, and how ought they? Doubtless many clients, thinking 
they know what they want - or wishing to appear to know -
encourage the lawyer to believe he is consulted solely for a techni-
cal expertise, for a knowledge of how to do legal things, for his 
ability to interpret legal words, or for the objective way he looks 
at legal and practical outcomes. It is as if the lawyer were being 
invited to join the client in a conspiracy of silence; the point of 
the conspiracy is that in silence neither shall question the as-
sumption that the means can be truly separated from the end and 
that the end is the client's sole problem and solely his. Such an 
idea of the lawyer's job seems to relieve him of the ethical respon-
sibility that might be his were he to assume a duty to comment 
on the wisdom or virtue of what his client is about. I do not think 
the burden of commenting upon the client's purposes can be so 
easily avoided. The interaction of lawyer and client is a moral 
event, whether morals are explicitly broached in conversation or 
not. The question is not whether the lawyer can or ought com-
ment, but what message does he convey? 
It is not self-evident that the transactions of lawyers and 
their clients are as I have stated, so let me say a little more. The 
view of the lawyer as a technician in service of a client-principal 
we may call instrumentalism: the lawyer is an instrument of his 
client's purposes. Instrumentalism of this sort is, interestingly, a 
psychological theory as well as a theory of legal ethics. That idea 
of how the lawyer ought to respond to his client is very like a 
widely held picture of the relation between the parts attributed 
to our conscious selves, which are commonly called either mind 
and will or reason and emotion. This notion of self is peculiar. It 
appears to be merely a description. However, in discourse about 
what it means to be human, we place value on these two parts, 
preferring one to the other, or describing one as more noble or 
more human. These judgments seem at times so contradictory as 
to call into question the model on which they are based. Reason 
is commonly thought to be our better or higher part - our noble, 
truly human part, the part that seeks truth and adapts itself to 
the world. Yet reason is an instrument in service of the irrational 
will, our recalcitrant, given, animal part. On the other hand, we 
find in that stubborn, irrational, emotive part the individuality 
often thought to be crying for expression. So it is that reason tells 
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us how to get what we want. But what we want is what we want, 
and that's the end of it. 
Instrumentalism as a philosophy of legal practice implies 
that the lawyer and client together carry on a discussion of the 
kind a proponent of the psychology just discussed would say goes 
on inside a man's head: The will (the client) says, "This is what 
I want." The brain (the lawyer), may answer, "Here is how to get 
it," or, "If you try to get that, you will lose this other thing you 
cherish. (If you agree to fix prices, you may go to jail.)" That idea 
of how the mind works is widely ,held but woefully incomplete, 
and, in all but routine matters, so is the corresponding idea of the 
relation between a lawyer and a client. A problem common to 
both cases is the assumption that mind and will do not interact 
but are independent entities. That psychology ignores how prefer-
ences affect (some would say corrupt) the reason and how prefer-
ences in turn may be shaped by rhetoric, time, and experience. 
The conscious mind can influence the preferences attributed to 
will or emotions. The mind can and does say, "That act is de-
meaning," or more often, "Despite your qualms, that act is O.K." 
Life will imitate art, and people try to live their interior lives as 
if this model truly described the parts of the self. In consequence, 
we commonly allow reason to overbear feelings of discomfort. It 
is exactly so between lawyer and client. The lawyer's reason can 
overbear the client's feelings. He can be persuaded to do that 
which he would have felt badly about doing or not to do that 
which it would ht~.ve comforted him to do. But even the lawyer's 
silence plays an influential part. The lawyer is always a third-
party commentator upon the client's interior dialogue. To be si-
lent in the face of a decision to let rational. self-interest override 
feelings is to approve that decision. Whatever the lawyer does, he 
cannot be simply an instrument but is inevitably a party. 
The instrumentalists' view fails not only because the lawyer 
cannot avoid being a party to the client's decision, but because 
the client has no decision before he sees his lawyer. It is required 
by the instrumentalist view that a client have, when he comes to 
the lawyer's office, a clear set of preferences, intransigent to dis-
cussion or circumstances. But there is no such set of preferences 
inside an individual that he can trot out when he gets to the 
lawyer's office. There is, then, no clear will of which the lawyer 
can be the simple instrument. The client may say, to take an 
obvious example, "I want a divorce." That goal of the client is a 
result, usually of his feeling trapped, hurt, and hopeless of any 
other way of coming to terms with his wife. It is not in any pro-
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found sense what he wants. If a lawyer could magically return 
that marriage to a happy state, we should certainly call him a fool 
or worse if he were to bypass that opportunity on the ground that 
the client, having said, "I want a divorce," had defined beyond 
question the scope of the lawyer's obligation. The best that can 
be said of a divorce is that it is not what the client wants, but 
only that which at the moment seems to him most likely to move 
him toward that interior state of comfort or satisfaction that all 
of us ultimately seek. 
In fact, everything we want to achieve we want ultimately 
because of the connection we suppose it to have to a desired 
feeling. Therefore, what we want is not the things we say we want, 
but the feelings we suppose they will produce. The list a client 
brings to a lawyer's office is not a ranking of desired states, but 
only of what the client supposes may produce them. Our judg-
ment on issues of that sort is especially likely to be bad at the 
crucial time we go to a lawyer. We say we want justice when we 
want love. We say we were treated illegally when we hurt. We 
insist upon our rights when we have been snubbed or cut. We 
want money when we feel impotent. We are likely to act most sure 
of ourselves when most desperately we want a simple, human 
response. If this is true, the lawyer presenting himself as an un-
critical mirror is not a satisfaction but a disappointment. The 
lawyer is in~the deeper sense not then doing what the client wants. 
It may well be that in a given situation a lawyer can do no more 
than accept a particular client's statement of his desires. But that 
is not because he ought to be his client's tool or because he must 
be. (The reason for not pressing a particular client on the issue 
of his goals must be found elsewhere. It is a question I shall return 
to in a moment). ' 
The problem of all - client, lawyer, judge - is the choice 
of acts: which to do, which to advise to do, what to say of those 
that have been done. I have adopted the traditional view that all 
people seek the good, or happiness, which is achieved in living 
and doing in the world. The relation between particular acts that 
might be done or things that might be gotten in the world and 
that interior state of being called happiness is not a necessary or 
simple one. Logic does not tell us which acts will produce that 
state; that is the subject matter of what Aristotle and St. Thomas 
Aquinas called practical wisdom. Practical wisdom, the virtue of 
those who know how to live well, is the poorly understood product 
of age and experience. Through time and with sensitivity we may 
learn to recognize what in a given situation will most advance us 
1082 Michigan Law Review lVol. 77:1078 
toward that inner comfort that is the good and the sum of what 
we want. 
Th~ lawyer is consulted as a man of practical wisdom. 
People, despite an insistent undercurrent of distrust of the profes-
sion, widely look to lawyers as worthy advisers and take seriously 
what they have to say. Surely every lawyer has at some time 
dissuaded a client from some wasteful or destructive pursuit. 
Every lawyer, no matter what he says of the rhetoric of instru-
mentalism, has at so:rp.e time recognized and taken advantage of 
a client's being malleable in his preferences, getting him to drop 
a personally malicious suit, or to settle rather than fight and 
thereby to reestablish a friendship, a business relation, or a mar-
riage. The occasions may be few, but they are sufficient to dem-
onstrate that the simple instrumentalist view does not describe a 
necessary reality. A lawyer can obtrude a personal judgment upon 
the wisdom of a client's expressed desires, and the client · can 
change his mind. 
III 
About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-
be clients that they are damned fools and should stop. 
Elihu Root 
I suspect that many adopt the instrumentalist view less be-
cause of any very firm belief that it describes what the lawyer 
ought to do than because it is so difficult to broach with the client 
a touchy moral or emotional issue. For most of us such moral and 
personal points are hard to make under any circumstances. How 
much harder to risk making such a point with an apparently self-
confident stranger. How do I tell him it is small to pursue a petty 
claim, unbecoming to maneuver an advantage, destructive to or-
ganize one's life around the hope of a successful suit? How do I 
say to an alcoholic client that he ought to suffer the penalty for a 
drunk driving charge, rather than be gotten off, or tell a sex 
offender that he ought to be committed for treatment? 
There is the problem. I do not think I like what this client 
wants to do, but I would feel very uncomfortable raising the issue. 
What, then, do I as a lawyer do? Here is the difficult answer: I 
admit to myself that I cannot talk to a particular client who is 
off-putting or overwhelming or cock-sure, and that I would proba-
bly be a better person and lawyer if I could. This seems costly 
because it requires first that I take the trouble to discover in each 
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case what I ought to do, and second that I recognize that, like 
every other human being, I cannot do everything. Neither the 
introspection nor the confession is comfortable. It is no wonder we 
are tempted to avoid them. And seemingly we can. We can at-
tempt to rationalize our engaging upon a distasteful course cho-
sen by a client on the ground that what is to be done is the client's 
decision and we are but tools·. That way we try to persuade our-
selves that internal discomforts can be safely ignored. 
It only seems easier to adopt the instrumentalist rationaliza-
tion for proceeding unquestioningly in courses we do not really 
like. But it certainly does seem easier, for there is much in the 
culture to support such a decision: Everything tells us to isolate 
our own feelings and to respect even the most obviously riddled 
barrier the client may have erected. Certain issues are personal. 
It is in bad taste to explore them. Delicacy urges us not to make 
a client face his cupidity. Better we be its tool. Reason is trust-
worthy; feelings are not. Judgments of this sort are mere matters 
of taste. Taste is idiosyncratic and personal. What right have we 
to impose our tastes upon others? A becoming modesty urges us 
not to assert any view that might discomfort another. Everyone 
needs space to grow, yes, even to make mistakes. We ought stand 
in no one's way, do nothing to influence the natural course of a 
personality's flowering according to its own inner motive (a ver-
sion of the error of the unchangeable set of preferences). And I 
have not yet touched the rhetoric of the adversary system or of 
liberal proceduralism. The point is that we are invited by both 
ideology and apparent convenience into a psychic trap. Instru-
mentalism offers us an argument with which to bludgeon such 
feelings as aversion or sympathy, which might lead us to respond 
as humans to our clients' predicaments. It seems an attractive 
alternative to the intimidating prospect of living with our clients 
as judging fellow men. But, as the economist says, there is no free 
lunch. We pay for such uneasy peace of mind as instrumentalism 
offers us. If feeling may be influenced by persuasive reflection, it 
is not talked out of existence by rationality. It is there and accu-
mulates in the form of distaste with ourselves and what we are 
doing. The consequences of accumulating distaste can be person-
ally disastrous: alcoholism, hypertension, an early heart attack, 
even suicide. 
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IV 
For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instru-
ment, and all things useful are of such a nature that where there 
is too much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate be 
of no use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, the greater it 
is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful as well as noble is 
appropriate to such subjects. 
Aristotle 
On one side of the table an attorney, trying to hide, both from 
his own feelings and the client's, behind a wall called instrumen-
talism; on the other side a client, anxious, even if he will not 
admit it, for any hint he can get from the lawyer of how to be a 
good client, a good person, and happy. For the ordinary, infre-
quent user of lawyers, the approach to one is likely to be an 
important event in exciting, sometimes dangerous, sometimes 
hopeful circumstances: criminal indictment, divorce, home buy-
ing, injury, accident, business expectations, estate matters, or 
dealing with obtrusive and threatening regulatory agencies. The 
client does not know the substance of his problem or perhaps even 
what to expect from his lawyer. It is in large measure up to the 
lawyer to define what the relation is going to be. It is his ethical 
responsibility. The client will find judgments in the lawyer's be-
havior no matter how the lawyer attempts, in the act of protecting 
himself, to avoid judging. The client will find his guidance, if the 
attorney is silent, in that silence. As the silent mind approves the 
errant will, so the compliant attorney approves the client's. 
I suppose the effect of silence is clear enough. What may be 
less evident is that the way the lawyer approaches even that 
narrow range of questions which the instrumentalist will admit 
are within his expertise will influence the client and involve both 
in a major moral commitment. The lawyer's style will almost 
certainly be utilitarian. Utilitarian ethical thinking has been so 
successful and become so much a part of our culture that we think 
in the way recommended by utilitarians without our even realiz-
ing that we are thinking ethically, let alone that we have made a 
commitment to an ideology. 
Reviewing Charles Fried's book, Right and Wrong, Brian 
Barry remarked in the January 1979 Yale Law Journal that there 
are few.utilitarians left - which perhaps has to do with the new 
concern with morality generally and that of the lawyer particu-
larly. Professor Fried's work is an evidence of that concern, and 
in a way, so is Barry's. And I suppose it true that there remain 
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but a handful of serious philosophers who espouse utilitarianism 
and that Professor Fried's work rides the crest of the new wave. 
But while it is blessedly true that in the small circle of important 
thinkers the fashion of ethical thinking has shifted, the problem 
with which I am concerned is not ethical thinking but ethical 
doing. Utilitarianism is not just intellectually wrong. It is pro-
foundly, destructively wrong in the everyday lives of all who have 
been suckered into believing it. And in truth, regardless of the 
fashions of professional philosophers, we have all become, and in 
large measure remain, utilitarians. We are all converted. The 
horse is very much alive, if its master is not. To rid ourselves of 
its power over us, we must continue to name it and to beat upon 
it. 
Part of utilitarianism's appeal may be the result of a peculiar 
fact. Utilitarianism is originally an ethical theory, a theory by 
which it is supposed to be possible to discover the morally right 
act - as a matter either of public policy or of private behavior. 
Yet a utilitarian demonstration is viewed as a morally neutral, 
supremely practical guide to action. Where one would not dare 
urge that an act is morally right or wrong, one would feel quite 
free to comment upon its utility. Utility is socially acceptable; 
morality is not. If pressed, we suppose, though there is no proof, 
that long-run utilities are moral, that consideration of the long 
run will lead us to avoid bad behavior. Therefore, when we want 
to influence people to act in the manner we believe right, we are 
likely to try to persuade them of the long-run utility of doing so. 
("Let us save the environment for our future, despite apparent 
short-run gains from ransacking it," but not "A good man would 
so use the world that it is none the worse for his having been 
here.") The practical utilitarian, therefore, thinks he can have it 
both ways; he has a moral guide to behavior without the taint of 
being a moralist or the possibility of ever discomfiting anyone. He 
is supremely reasonable. But once again, the price of self-delusion 
can be high. 
The center of utilitarian ethical theory is the command that 
I so act as to produce the greatest good, or, at least a net gain in 
utilities. It is a powerful, persuasive idea. It is a command to do 
good. What could be more reasonable? How do I know what is 
good? I compare outcomes, imagining the sequence of events that 
would follow upon my taking one course or another. The destruc-
tive implication of the seductive idea is that imagined future 
states are the test of present acts. Therefore, Marxists, covert 
utilitarians that they are, judge acts in history by their conse-
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quences. "The Communist Party in Germany in the interwar 
period made a mistake in not seeing that the Nazis rather than 
the center party represented the real threat. Hac;l they allied with 
the center, perhaps Hitler would never come to power." So, in my 
private life, had I not wasted my time in school, I would have 
made more money. This concern with outcomes is sometimes 
called consequentialism. As a means of determining how to act, 
it can be distinguished from ethical theories that say acts are 
good or bad in themselves at the time they are done. We operate 
with a stock of such judgments about the native wrongness of 
lying, cheating, stealing, or hurting and in ordinary conversations 
often treat this old stock as if it were still fresh and salable. But 
when we think the least bit about such matters, we are likely to 
think in outcome ter'ms, even going so far as to say "lying is bad 
because ... ," followed by a list of consequentialist reasons: to 
lie is to encourage distrust, set a bad example, lose credibility. 
And if we cannot think of an undesirable outcome, we are hard 
put to accept that we should nonetheless not do that bad act. 
Utilitarian consequentialism has so swept the field and become 
so deeply ingrained a way of thinking that it is hard to think 
about acts wrong in themselves without adding a consequentialist 
explanation. I daresay any number of readers will find it hard to 
decide any matter of importance without relying upon a compari-
son of outcomes. (The way to do it is to act as you please.) 
This pervasive way of thinking about everyday decisions we 
might call practical utilitarianism. By that I mean the use of 
outcome analysis not in search of the general good, or even in the 
name of historic public policy issues, but in the service of self-
interest in ordinary personal matters. There is, of course, a theory 
that the general good is promoted by the seeking of private good, 
that the general good is, in fact, the sum of private goods. If that 
is so, there is no need for a governing hand and we are licensed 
to seek our ends as we see fit. Such truth as there is in the identity 
of general and private good - and it is a profound truth - is 
perverted when the ends we seek are chosen on the assumption 
that people rationally maximize egoistic self-interest. In a word, 
I can so choose what it is I seek as to disconnect my idea of my 
·good from the general good. But at this point that is an aside. The 
claims of welfare economics and liberal politics are for the politi-
cal arena. At the moment, I am concerned only to make the point 
that a client's contact with a lawyer is quite likely to involve a 
lesson in practical utilitarianism. Even when the lawyer tries to 
be neutral, he gives a lesson in the particular philosophy of moral 
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analysis that judges acts by their consequences. It is a lesson that 
is not less sweeping in its implications and not less destructive 
because other classes in the same subject meet elsewhere. 
One of the ways a client and lawyer are likely to be corrupted 
by utilitarianism is the result of its being not a closed but an open 
system - a fact easily overlooked. What I mean is that utilitari-
anism is not sufficient without more to answer a moral question. 
Before we can weigh outcomes, we need to know how they are to 
be valued. If a public policy under consideration would result in 
greater egg production, we do not know whether it is a good policy 
unless we know - from somewhere else - whether we want more 
or fewer eggs. Utilitarianism does not answer that question. It 
says only that we should ask it. 
One reason we seldom notice the open character of utilita-
rianism is because to make decisions we normally consider only 
noncontroversial outcomes. The general presumption would be 
that more eggs is a good. So long as all agree upon the advantage 
of perpetually increasing the gross national product, the limits of 
public debate will be narrow, and the impression will be sustain~ 
able that we are engaged simply in minor problems of assessing 
the utilities. Utilitarianism collapses, however, when the consen-
sus that is its necessary support collapses, as when a significant 
minority becomes committed to environmental protection. There 
is no utilitarian resolution to the argument between the paper 
manufacturers who emit wastes and the fisherman and others 
who do not want mercury in the Wisconsin River. 
Much of what the lawyer does may seem to be based upon 
consensus and hence to raise no such difficult question, but often 
it is only the force of the lawyer's experience and position that 
makes a real conflict disappear. The substantive ethical act that 
the lawyer cannot avoid, even through instrumentalism, is the act 
of filling in the blanks in the utilitarian calculus. And there is the 
rub. The values or ends the lawyer chooses are likely to be equiva-
lents in private life of a greater gross national product in public 
debate, the readily assumed, the safe, the self-evident: more 
money, freedom from incarceration or procedural delay. Yet for 
many clients, such goods are neither what they want nor what 
they need. Hardly anyone will dispute that the goods a utilitarian 
seeks are desirable. The getting of money is generally a good. So 
is freedom, so is time. William Simon, writing in the 1978 
Wisconsin Law Review, says the lawyer creates a standardized 
person to whom he attributes standardized ends. The lawyer then 
acts for that hypothetical client rather than the one before him. 
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It would hardly be said of the standard client that his best inter-
est may be a result that stings him or one that, at first blush, he 
would prefer to avoid. The values furthered by s.uch decisions are 
likely to be less obvious than, for instance, the greatest net im-
provement in financial position. Yet the real client may in some 
sense want or need that seemingly less attractive result. What I 
want to discuss in the balance of this Article is how utilitarianism 
in specific kinds of familiar counseling situations leads to giving 
clients bad advice, advice that sacrifices their humanity in the 
name of seemingly self-evident goods. 
My father-in-law, Charles Wooster, tells of clients of his, a 
husband and wife, who had been moved to give a sizeable gift to 
a friend who had shown them care and love. Mr. Wooster encour-
aged them to put off giving until the next year because a gift given 
that year would have been taxed less heavily. The following Janu-
ary, husband and wife were killed in the same accident, before 
the gift was delivered; there was thereafter no way to transfer the 
gift. The intended donee had lost out because of Mr. Wooster's 
tax advice. So, too, the donors had been denied the pleasure of 
bestowing the gift. The event suggests to a nice conscience that 
perhaps the advice had been wrong in the first place. Mr. Wooster 
was unhappy with the result, but could see nothing else - with 
the clients alive before him and no crystal ball - that would have 
been right for him to have done. 
I described the problem to another lawyer-kinsman, Robert 
Keegan, whose response was, "Those are the breaks." I for a 
moment suspected him of being unfeeling, but, of course, Kee-
gan's is the conclusion Wooster finally reached, too. Keegan had 
been over that ground. He wisely refused to be led into guilt-
inducing reflections. A lawyer can but make the best projection 
his lights allow. He is not responsible for the acts of God. Kee-
gan's is the reasonable judgment of a sane man in the face of an 
unhappy result. But the question remains whether there had been 
any practical way a lawyer in Wooster's position might avoid that 
kind of unhappy result. Does the necessity of giving advice on tax 
consequences trap a lawyer into encouraging his client in the 
belief that those consequences should guide his action? 
A practicing lawyer, call him Doe, who also teaches client 
counseling, said that he is very concerned, in doing estate mat-
ters, with the possibility that a client will be overborne by infor-
mation about tax consequences. His tactic to avoid that result is 
to persuade his client - before there is any mention of those 
consequences - to expand'in as much detail as possible upon 
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what it is he wants to do. Only after that does Doe point out costs 
and mention ways the client's plan could be changed to save 
money. In teaching as well as in practice, Doe is trying to take 
account of the power a lawyer has to impress upon a client the 
importance of his lawyerly considerations. The progress repre-
sented by Doe's concerned approach is the recognition that the 
client's values may not be the lawyer's, or more precisely, that the 
real, live client's interests may not match those of the "standard 
client" for whom lawyers are won_t to model their services. 
An increasing awareness that the lawyer may improperly af-
fect the client's decision is one tolerably healthy outgrowth of the 
pop psychology of the Miranda decision. In the lawyer's office, the 
client is likely, as Miranda in the police station, to conform his 
behavior to the expectations of the authority figure in residence. 
This is a grossly inadequate model of Miranda's behavior as ei-
ther detainee or client, but the problem it was developed to de-
scribe, the protection of genuinely free decision making, is more 
serious in the law office than in the police station. If the problem 
is described in Miranda terms, the solution must isolate the client 
from corrupting influence, must let the lawyer say what he has 
to say without rearranging the preferences the client came in 
with. That is the worthy goal of Doe's manipulation of the order 
in which he presents tax information and an attractive-seeming 
goal that would find wide support in both psychological and legal 
literature. 
I told Doe of a friend of mine, a widow recovering from alco-
holism, who is fifty-four years old. Her house has become a bur-
den to her, perhaps even a threat to her sobriety, although it 
might seem overly dramatic to say as much to a stranger. If she 
waits until she is fifty-five, the better part of a year, the large 
capital gain on the house will be tax free. She decided she did not 
want to go to a lawyer for fear he might talk her into putting off 
the sale. I asked Doe if that were realistic. He said her fear was 
well grounded; a lawyer might well give her the impression that 
another year in the house ought to be suffered for the tax saving. 
(I expect a lawyer's inclination to press the merits of his money-
saving advice reflects, among other things, a pesire to feel that 
his expertise is really useful. We may know no other way to judge 
our own usefulness.) 
One possible analysis of these cases is that suggested by Doe: 
that the lawyer needs to be careful to discover what it is the client 
is really about, to give fullest possible opportunity for her inter-
ests to be explored, and to avoid the over-bearing assertion of 
1090 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 77:1078 
simple money saving. That point is made dramatically in the case 
of the alcoholic widow. It might appear as well that such an 
approach would ameliorate if not solve Wooster's problem. The 
point is, perhaps, that no advice should be shown favor by the 
lawyer. Then he need not fear responsibility for the client's deci-
sion should it come out badly. 
The problem being described occurs because utilitarian anal-
ysis is incomplete until someone fills in the price tags of costs and 
benefits. When the lawyer's standard array of price tags doesn't 
quite work, the first solution is to pass the buck to the client. Give 
him some uncolored information and let him decide. Modifying 
the sequence in which information is presented can be at best 
palliative, no more effective than most other efforts to make 
people free and wise by manipulating information, whether by 
pressing it on people, withholding it from them, or shaping the 
circumstances in which it is passed on. All are based upon the 
faulty psychological model with which we began, the one adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Miranda: At the human core is the will, 
the irrational, emotive drive, at its best when under the rein of 
an intellect that guides it to its long-run self-interest. But, as we 
notice, rationality can lose control. The will can be corrupted by 
external, nonrational things or events, like the authority of a 
lawyer or policeman, or shares of stock in the defendant firm, or 
appeals to emotion. The problem of the lawyer or government 
agency is to assure that only rational influences play upon those 
in their charge so that the presumed internal preferences will be 
able to realize themselves freely by the best light of reason. (As 
we have said, there is no such fixed core of the self.) Rational 
behavior is, as we are wont to see it, the maximization of egoistic 
self-interest (which is presumably the will's real preference). Our 
great intellectual problem is to account for altruism. The only 
time we are sure that people are behaving rationally is when they 
are behaving badly. We are, therefore, driven to give people the 
opportunity to behave so, because we are a free society. Life fol-
lows art and they misbehave. The only cure for antisocial behav-
ior consistent with freedom is information addressed to reason. If, 
after the administration of more information, the subject still 
decides egoistically or in a self-destructive way, we who gave the 
information claim no responsibility. That is our model of the 
political order, of how to deal with cigarette smoking, the integ-
rity of politicians and judges, the doctor-patient relation when a 
serious medical procedure is under consideration, fair campaign 
practices, medical experimentation, legal education, the relation 
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between the police and the arrestee, and so on, and on and on. 
We wash our hands of responsibility for participating in moral 
discussion by transmitting largely useless, often incomprehen-
sible information about outcomes. We talk and talk and talk. We 
criticize those who fail to collect boring information. We inundate 
ourselves with news. And we so greatly fear the impropriety of any 
other kind of influence that we fly to purified procedure and 
ethical "neutrality," hoping to absolve ourselves· of responsibility. 
No, a higher antisepsis is not the answer to the lawyer's undue 
influence. It is engaged in not for the client's benefit but for our 
own. 
Indeed, the only way, finally, that a lawyer can deal with the 
problem is to cease to deal with it. It is impossible so to organize 
my behavior that it is not manipulative. It is impossible to act 
so as to make another man free. Whether I plan to say my piece 
on the tax advantages of deferral first or last or in the middle, 
loudly or softly, with deprecation or enthusiasm, my influence 
will be corrupting and destructive. The only thing the lawyer can 
do for his client is be free himself, which means free to be honest 
in saying exactly what he thinks and feels, to confront himself. 
It is transcendence for a lawyer to say to a client: "I am fearful 
of influencing you unduly in this matter. The tax saving is there. 
It may be important to you to save the money. If so, by all means 
defer the gift. But money saving is not everything. One should 
hardly organize one's life around a revenue code. I will think none 
the less of you whether you choose to defer or not. Some people, 
I suspect, may be embarrassed - odd as it may sound - to ignore 
an apparent financial advantage, for to do so sounds irrational. 
Let me assure you, I would respect most highly a man who· will 
do now what seems right to him now. What sounds rational is not 
always humanly reasonable. . . . " The important thing about 
any such message is not that it be calculated to neutralize the 
legal-rational bias, the legal influence, but that it be honest and 
not intended to manipulate. Sometimes a side benefit of the 
speaker's honesty is a shock in the listener that shakes· him loose 
and helps him be free. · 
V 
Run where you have light, lest the shadow of death come upon you. 
John 12:35 
The objection to utilitarian advice that we have been talking 
about is that there is a need to insert moral values into the calcu-
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lation utilitarianism urges us to make. Once the choice of values 
comes out into the open, the question is whether it is to be done 
by the lawyer alone, by the client alone, or jointly. Once the 
choice comes out into the open the attractive apparent neutrality 
of utilitarian consequentialism disappears. The value questions 
must finally be faced. It is possible through self-awareness and 
honesty, which is the important basis of Doe's style of advice, to 
reduce the likelihood of the lawyer's imposing either his own val-
ues or the set presumed to be adopted by the standard, rationally 
self-interested ego. But there is an even more general problem 
with the utilitarian giving of advice that is independent of the 
values we assign to specific outcomes. That general problem is 
consequentialism itself: the idea that the way to decide how to 
act now is not to consider one's present disposition and the merit 
of the act in question, but to consider the value of the conse-
quences of doing the act. 
One of the reasons utilitarianism has such a seductive, 
sweetly reasonable character is that our most serious moral 
qualms concern present behavior rather than outcomes. Utilitari-
anism appears to avoid the controversies about th~ ethical char-
acter of present acts by placing the facts relevant for decisions in 
a future where only the outcomes, and no longer the acts, are in 
question. Present acts are neutral save in their consequences. We 
need never ask if we are doing right, so long as we survive the 
judgment of history. It is a Faustian kind of promise. 
The conflict in Wooster's case is not only between two values 
but also between present and future, between the gratification of 
a present desire to be munificent and the value in the future of a 
tax saving. Surrender to the present inclination is an act of indif-
ference to outcome. To do that which is pleasing now seems natu-
ral, and so it would seem that outcomes ought in our decisions to 
be at quite a discount to present satisfaction. That is seldom true 
in these strange days. Indeed the contrary is true. The present is 
at discount to the future. That is the essence of utilitarianism. We 
always judge how to act now by imagined future states. What was 
grasped at as an apparently easy way to make decisions rationally 
has so taken hold that maturity is defined by the ability to defer 
a present gratification. A person who fails to do so is childish. 
That ideological prop is assisted by another equally sturdy one 
(which we have already come upon): that our rational is our bet-
ter part and ought to control the nonrational. Feeling about how 
to act in a present situation is always nonrational; the disposi-
tion to act - to reach out or draw back or whatever - is exactly 
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a feeling. It feels good to do. The body aches to reach out to 
someone; fear holds it back, or, happily, does not. That feeling is 
in the way we apprehend the situation. Whatever it is, it is not 
the product of what we ordinarily mean by rational analysis. We 
may choose to respond to those feelings or not. When we do, we 
are in the present; when we do not, we are guiding our actions by 
a reason that refers forward toward outcome or backward for 
authority. In doing so, we are apt to lose the force of the unique 
and only present - and consequently to act inappropriately or 
ineffectively or so as not to have the pleasure of our lives. 
So little are we allowed to regard the present that a client is 
likely to have difficulty even expressing the wise, human inclina-
tion to do the presently right-seeming and satisfying thing, espe-
cially if the lawyer is telling him how this or that will be saved or 
protected by deferral. The lawyer becomes an ally of the mean 
spirit that tells us we ought to live in and for the future; we ought 
to suffer and deprive ourselves of the only gratification possible 
- that which occurs presently. Present gratification in the law 
office is the prerogative of the eccentric client, the crotchety and 
willful. The solid everyday client does not do that kind of thing, 
and the lawyer will not let him. 
That is, I think, a common problem in legal counseling. Con-
sider another example, attorney Ken Hur's commercials in the 
Madison, Wisconsin, area for his Legal Clinic. As a part of his ad, 
Hur offers a word of advice to indicate what it is the lawyer can 
do for the client. In one ad he tells the listener who might be 
involved in an accident not to say to an injured victim, "I am 
sorry"; such a statement might be taken as an admission of re-
sponsibility. Whatever the merits of this bit of advice, it is exactly 
legal advice, embodying all the smug satisfaction of the inade-
quate practitioner's access to a black art and all the insensitivity 
the critic would like to attribute to law and lawyers. That it flies 
in the face of all instinct, that it calls upon us to be inhumane, 
that is bespeaks the complete surrender of feeling to rationality 
are all reasons why one wants so desperately as a lawyer to find 
an audience to whom that advice can be given. 
It might be argued that these instances are but the perverse 
results of the ignorant and insensitive trying to make utilitarian 
decisions. Certainly no utilitarian philosopher would be so bold 
as to claim that the lawyer's function is to assess "objective," 
external utilities, so as to counteract the humanly irrational de-
sire to be nice now, or to reach out, or to be modest and accepting. 
Those, too, are weighable utilities. 'The trouble is, I think, that 
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they are weighable utilities to you and me discussing in utili-
tarian terms whether to adopt a policy such that, in the future, 
people might be discouraged from their then-present inclinations. 
We have, in a word, put the present into the future, so that 
utilitarians can weigh it in their own terms. But when the trade-
off is not, by such a trick, between two futures, but between a 
present and a future, the practical, if not the necessary result, 
seems to be precisely that sacrifice of present to future. And the 
inclination to make that sacrifice is supported, as we have seen, 
by the widespread notion that maturity is self-denial and that 
reason is better than feeling. 
The fruit of that attitude in cases such as those I have de-
scribed is that a surrender to admirable and wholesome present 
feelings is resisted by reason and replaced by an unbecoming self-
interest based upon long-run calculation. The puritanism by 
which the mind gains ascendency over the spirit generates exactly 
the evil it was expected to prevent. 
In healthy decision making, reason is a critical force. I am 
unhappy that "critical" has been taken over by the Left, as in the 
Critical Legal Studies conference, to describe a character of mind 
that belongs properly to anyone who believes in the possibility of 
rational discourse on ethical questions. Decision making is an art, 
concerned with the particular and sui generis. Criticism by the 
rational mind plays the same role in making decisions that it does 
in making art. Unfortunately the Left can lay claim to the term 
by default, for only on the Left may one find today widespread 
faith in the possibility of rational criticism of ethical questions. 
In the art of decision making, which is a process in which 
criticism can play a direct role, and often (at least) ought to, the 
possible consequences are a relevant consideration. I would like 
to know what the consequences might be. But I am deciding what 
to do in a present situation. The rightness of a decision inheres 
in its responsiveness to the situation I am in. That present situa-
tion includes some knowledge on my part of possible outcomes. I 
am not likely to think it right to do now that which I am reasona-
bly persuaded will later seriously and inevitably hurt another. 
But a list of possible outcomes is only a small part of the situation 
in which I want to act. 
The situation in Wooster's case includes a feeling of indebt-
edness on the part of the clients, a welling up of the desire to give, 
in a continuing emotional exchange with the party who, by the 
clients' death, lost his reward. We continually give things to each 
other to generate in ourselves the sense of rightness that comes 
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from the alternating experiences of gratitude as recipient and 
gratitude as donor. In the exchange we find most of the psycho-
logical support we need to survive as content people: the feelings 
of worth, of effectiveness, of loving and being loved. The external 
product, the by-product as it were, is a web of good feelings and 
obligation. Indeed, one may say that the exchange of gifts, kind-
nesses, service, and hospitality are, if not the substance, at least 
the warp and woof of all social life. The need for ties even at the 
price of rationality is demonstrated by the widespread practice of 
men alternately buying drinks for each other. Such gifting pairs 
are to be found in every bar, for the inclination to enter them is 
profound. 
The rhythm of gift-giving has its own rules, so that relations 
do not become one-sided and oppressive or so infrequent as to fall 
apart. The art of leadership lies in the timely and measured dis-
tribution of rewards (gifts) for services. So does the art of friend-
ship. These are matters far too important to be controlled by the 
Internal Revenue Code. They are also matters that have su-
premely to do with the way we apprehend a present situation, not 
with the calculation of outcomes. 
It might at first appear otherwise. Reciprocal transactions 
are functionally necessary and, in a sense, as obligatory as con-
tracts; in the functional anthropologist's sense, we engage in 
them instrumentally, for the purpose of creating ties and obliga-
tions. But the workability of the system depends upon the actions 
being taken in a nonmanipulative, non-self-conscious way for the 
pure satisfaction that arises from the act of giving. We are well 
advised not to let our one hand know what the other does. Selfish 
motives telegraph themselves and corrupt the activity. Personal 
relations become personalized. In individual acts, attention to 
purpose and outcome is not only irrelevant, it also destroys the 
whole enterprise. A community exists exactly so far as in our 
internal experienc~, we behave disinterestedly in the special sense 
that outcome is not controlling. That an observer sees a larger 
social purpose demonstrates only that personal satisfaction and 
development is consonant with the furthering of the community. 
But in a way it is peculiar to describe the nonmanipulative 
ignoring of consequences as disinterested. It is really an impor-
tant change in the focus of interestedness from the future to the 
present, to doing what is right in the present because it feels good 
in the present because it is consonant with our best definition of 
ourselves. It is a completely interested, completely self-
interested, completely present state of mind, in which all.I do for 
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another is, after all, for myself right now, to make me feel good 
about myself. And it is a state of mind in which the question is 
the character of the act, not the outcome. This is the traditional 
and proper focus of ethical inquiry. It is difficult to deal with 
because in a real case, being sui generis, the problem of how to 
act cannot be rationally answered. Rationality has nothing to do 
with the individual, for it is inherently statistical. That means we 
have no certain guides, no clear answers, but must find our way 
as best we can. 
VI 
Whenever an important matter is to be undertaken in the monas-
tery, the abbot should call the entire community together and 
should set forth the agenda. After hearing the various opinions of 
the brothers, he should consider all and then do what he thinks 
best. We feel that all should meet for the Lord often reveals the 
best course to the younger monk. The brothers should give advice 
with humility and not presume stubbornly to defend their views. 
They should leave the question to the abbot's resolution so that 
they may all obey that which he decides is best. 
The Rule, St. Benedict 
Among those who first hear what I have to say, it is obvious 
that I hit some nerve. What I say is appealing. It is the way we 
would want the world to be. It is common also for readers to say, 
that may all be well and good in some limited situation; in private 
life, but not in public life; or in dealing with a naive client, but 
not with an experienced one; or for old lawyers but not for young 
ones; or where the client is human but not when it is a corporate 
entity. 
There is no doubt that it is more difficult for a young man 
than for an old man to be old. But we must all act according to 
the light we have. If because of youth we have nothing to say, it 
is no problem to us that we do not say it. If because of youth it is 
harder to say what we have to say, we had better confess it than 
pretend to ourselves that we ought not say it because that is not 
our role or our duty. The sophisticated client and the naive repre-
sent really the same problem as the young or old lawyer: the 
balance of personal power between the client and the attorney. 
And the answer is no different, because, after all, the ones to be 
saved are ourselves. 
The problem of the corporate client and the lawyer as public 
official or adviser is of a different sort and worth considerably 
more attention than that I shall give it here. I think the problem 
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that readers have had in mind arises because t4e person who sits 
, across from the lawyer-is apparently not the real client. The !eal 
client is either the fictitious person (corporation or state) or the 
absent mass of people who own the corporation or constitute the 
state. That being so, it would appear that the relation between 
the lawyer and the client's agent before him has to be somehow 
different from that which I have suggested. What, one may ask,. 
is the relevance of engaging in a moral discussion with him? The 
will in question, the will behind the suit, is not in the lawyer's 
office. , . 
The will in question, public or corporate, is only metaphori-
cally a will. There is nothing there, or nothing very much or very 
specific. At best there is a mass of wills each as disparate and 
uncertain as the single will' of the client sole. The problem with 
the corporation and with the state is, at bottom, how ought the 
real people act whose hands are on the levers of power. The met-
aphorical group will of the corporate boqy is at best a helpful 
guide to the discovery of answers to such difficult questions. 
In the case of the corporation, absent such a legislative his-
tory as we have sometimes in government, we seek the collective 
will of a constructed ego that bears a very close similarity to the 
one lawyers generally attribute to a client as they avoid contact 
with his individuality and their own: an ego committed to 
short-run self-interest, a rational calculator, a profit maximizer, 
Holmes's bad man. But why should this be so? It may appear to 
offer a firm foundation, just as does historical inquiry into the 
intent of the legislature. But it is a deceitful appearance. This 
constructed egoistic intent of stockholders or corporations has no 
more reality than the constructed historical intent of legislators. 
It is interesting only that ideology directs judges to find the justi-
fication for their acts in the authority of the past, while corporate 
managers are supposed to justify their acts in the promise of the 
future. Both methods carefully try to obscure the fact that action 
must be taken in the present, in circumstances as they are pres-
ently. And with corporations the action must be taken by those 
who are nominally the corporation's agents. Really, however, they 
are themselves. They can no more disentangle themselves than 
can lawyers. They, too, must finally decide what it is right for 
them to do. And the lawyer can help or hinder them in that 
process just as he can the client sole. There are no other people 
but people. 
Feast of St. Benedict, 
The First Day of Spring, 1979 
Fox Bluff, Wisconsin 

